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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, no Boston priest was more electrifying than Paul
Richard Shanley. Ordained in 1960, he sought and received from his
bishop, Boston cardinal Humberto Medeiros, a mission to minister to
"sexual minorities" in 1970 and became a well-known Boston "street
1507
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priest."' Wearing jeans and smoking Kool cigarettes, he gathered
about him runaway gay teenagers and advocated fiercely for gay
rights.2 Yet one of the boys drawn to him was the same one Shanley
would be convicted of sexually abusing in 2005.3 In a civil suit seeking
damages from the Archdiocese of Boston for its role in hiding
Shanley's abuse, the plaintiffs submitted at least twenty affidavits
from Shanley's victims detailing abuse from 1961 to 1988, including
accounts of child sexual abuse and oral and anal rape. 4 One victim's
affidavit states that during the abuse, "Father Shanley would explain
to me that he was a 'worker of God' and that the acts of abuse were
sanctioned by God."5
God is not amenable to suit in the United States for the acts of
His agents, but many victims have sued American bishops and
dioceses in the Catholic Church. 6 These suits have resulted in over $2
billion in settlements.7 Yet some victims are seeking the even deeper
pockets of the Holy See, the ecclesial administrative body of the
Catholic Church governed by the pope.8 The Holy See, an
internationally recognized sovereign that maintains formal relations
with 176 sovereign states and has permanent observer status at the
UN General Assembly,9 would normally receive immunity from suit
through the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"). 10 However, in
1. Sally Jacobs, "If They Knew the Madness in Me": A Search for the Real Rev. Paul
Shanley Suggests He was Part Hero, Part Horror, BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 2002, at Fl.
2. Id.
3. Pam Belluck, Defrocked Priest Convicted in 1980's Rape of Boy in Boston-Area Church,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at A16. Shanley appealed, claiming that the evidence of abuse
recovered from "repressed memories" was inadmissible. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court upheld the conviction. John R. Ellement, Former Catholic Priest's Bid for New Trial
Rejected: Use of Recovered Memories Upheld, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 2010, at B.4.
4. Twenty affidavits are available at http://www.bishop-accountability.org/accounts.
5. Affidavit of [name redacted] at 2, Ford v. Law, No. 02-04551-Ti (Mass. Super. Ct. July
21, 2003), available at http://www.bishop-accountability.org/ma-boston/archives/ShanleyMOR/
ShanleyMO_11_AffidavitExO8&R.pdf.
6. A diocese is a geographic area of ecclesial administration under the authority of a
bishop. An archdiocese is a diocese with administrative functions over a regional group of
dioceses and under the authority of an archbishop.
7. As of summer 2009, one victim's website has chronicled over $2 billion in settlement
money paid out to over 4,000 victims by dioceses across the United States.
BishopAccountability.org, Major Settlements and Monetary Awards in Civil Suits,
http://www.bishop-accountability.org/settlements (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
8. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND
NOTE: HOLY SEE (2010), http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/3819.htm.
9. Holy See Press Office, Bilateral and Multilateral Relations of the Holy See,
http://www.vatican.va/news-services/press/documentazione/documents/corpo-
diplomaticoindexen.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2008).
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two recent cases, O'Bryan v. Holy See" and Doe v. Holy See, 12 the
Sixth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that suits
against the Holy See may proceed through the tortious act exception of
the FSIA.13 The plaintiffs alleged that the Holy See was liable through
respondeat superior, a common law theory of vicarious liability holding
employers liable for their employees' tortious acts within the scope of
their employment.14
Although respondeat superior is an attractive theory of liability
to overcome the Holy See's sovereign immunity, it also presents a host
of thorny theoretical and practical problems. First, the Holy See's
unique status and the unique religious organization it administers
present difficult issues when applying traditional agency law. Priests,
who are citizens of the nations in which they work and maintain few
material ties to the Holy See, seem a far cry from the usual sovereign
agents who find themselves in court, such as diplomatic attach6s and
state-owned banks. Second, to properly understand the relationship
between a priest, a bishop, and the Holy See (and so to determine if
the priest really is the Holy See's employee), a court likely must delve
into Catholic theology. This raises the serious problem of determining
ecclesial relationships in a secular court, which must abstain from
religious questions under the doctrine of ecclesial abstention.
Finally, using state agency law to define the scope of
employment creates fairness and unpredictability issues. One of
Congress's major purposes in passing the FSIA was to ensure
uniformity and predictability in establishing jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns.' 5 However, a plaintiff in one state would be able to sue the
Holy See while another plaintiff in a different state would not. This
situation is unfair both to hundreds of potential plaintiffs, who would
not have the recourse to sue the Holy See, and to the Holy See itself,
as the courts would have to apply the FSIA according to the
employment rules of different state jurisdictions.
To overcome these problems and provide a uniformly applicable
law to the Holy See's sovereign immunity with regard to clerical abuse
cases, this Note argues that the test for command responsibility, the
11. O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 386 (6th Cir. 2009).
12. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009).
13. § 1605(a)(5). The tortious act exception to the FSIA allows a personal injury suit for
damages against a foreign sovereign to proceed when the injury is caused by an employee of the
sovereign acting within the scope of his employment. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
14. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1081; O'Bryan, 556 F.3d at 386.
15. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976, H.R. REP.
No. 94-1487, at 6-8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605-06.
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military criminal law analogue to respondeat superior,16 better suits
the Catholic Church. Command responsibility holds superiors liable
for their subordinates' criminal actions when, with effective control
over their subordinates, they know or should know of the actions and
fail to respond appropriately or punish their subordinates in the face
of an affirmative duty.17 The requirements of effective control and
knowledge take the nature of ecclesial authority out of Church
doctrine and focus instead on the de facto operations of the Catholic
Church and its actual knowledge of sexual abuse by clergy. Also,
applying the command responsibility test solves the practical issues of
fairness and unpredictability inherent in using state agency common
law by grounding the Holy See's duty to act in jus cogens norms of
international law. 18
Part II of this Note discusses the Holy See and the FSIA. Part
III analyzes the respondeat superior theory advanced in Doe and
O'Bryan and discusses the legal and practical problems it raises. Part
IV then turns to the command responsibility doctrine and
demonstrates how it provides a better legal lens for analyzing the
Holy See's complicity and liability in clerical sex abuse cases.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Sovereignty of the Holy See and Its Control Over Catholic Affairs
The Holy See is the central ecclesial administrative body of the
Catholic Church and the sovereign entity ruling Vatican City. The
pope is the head of state and directs the Roman Curia, a collection of
administrative units governing different ecclesial functions such as
religious life, evangelization, and church doctrine. Curial officials are
cardinals, bishops, and priests directly employed at the Vatican in the
different administrative units. In this Note, "Holy See" will refer to
the sovereign entity. "Pope" will refer only to the pope in his function
as head of state or as spiritual leader of the world's Catholics. "Curia"
will refer solely to the administrative body of the Church and the
clergy who staff it.
The Holy See occupies a unique position in international law.
Although the Holy See is the legal sovereign of the State of Vatican
16. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise,
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV.
75, 120 (2005).
17. Id. at 120-21 ("Indirect command responsibility arises from the culpable omissions of
commanders or superiors.").
18. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
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City, its claim to sovereignty does not rest on its territorial control of
the Vatican.' 9 Rather, the Holy See, under the direction of the pope,
has functioned as a sovereign since at least the time of Pope Leo I in
the fifth century. 20 Until the Reformation, the Holy See acted as the
spiritual authority over Western Europe. Kings sought the approval of
the popes in international affairs,21 fought wars against them, 22 and
approached them for mediation. 23
The unification of Italy in the 1860s and 1870s put an end to
the Holy See's territorial jurisdiction, 24 but this did not destroy its
status as an international sovereign. From 1870 to 1929, the Holy See
maintained its international rights and duties and continued to
receive envoys, consistent with the rights of an international
sovereign. 25 In 1929, the Holy See and Italy signed two treaties and a
concordat, together called the Lateran Pacts ("the Pacts"). The Pacts
permanently assured "to the Holy See a position de facto and de jure
which shall guarantee absolute independence."26 The two treaties
addressed political, legal, and financial issues, while the concordat
concerned religious issues.27 Since 1929, the Holy See has maintained
19. See Josef L. Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International Law, 46 AM. J. INT'L L.
308, 309-10 (1952) (outlining and rejecting the argument that the Holy See's sovereign status
depends on territorial control).
20. Robert Araujo, S.J., The International Personality and Sovereignty of the Holy See, 50
CATH. U.L. REV. 291, 296 (2001) ("Pope Leo the Great sent emissaries to both church councils and
to the courts of temporal sovereigns. These early legations did not represent the purely spiritual
sovereignty of the Holy See, but a temporal sovereignty whose voice would be heard throughout
the world's political communities.").
21. E.g., The Avalon Project, The Bull of Pope Adrian IV Empowering Henry II to Conquer
Ireland. A.D. 1155, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edulmedieval/bullad.asp (last visited Aug.
31, 2010) (writing to Henry II, "[Iln order the better to [spread the Christian religion to Ireland],
thou dost ask the advice and favour of the apostolic see.").
22. Religion scholar Eamon Duffy refers to Pope Julius 11 (1502-1513) as "the warrior-pope"
and references a sixteenth-century satire attributed to Erasmus, in which Saint Peter refuses to
admit the armor-clad pope and his army of ghosts into heaven. EAMON DUFFY, SAINTS AND
SINNERS: A HISTORY OF THE POPES 152 (3d ed. 2006).
23. Spain and Portugal sought papal mediation to resolve land claims in the new world.
Pope Alexander VI's bull Inter Caetara decreed that the line be drawn "one hundred leagues
towards the west and south from any of the islands commonly known as the Azores and Cape
Verde." Catholic Forum, Pope Alexander VI-The Bull Inter Caetara-4 May 1493, available at
http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/pope0214a.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
24. For a history of Italian unification and the subsequent "Roman Question" of the
Vatican's status, see generally DAVID I. KERTZER, PRISONER OF THE VATICAN: THE POPES, THE
KINGS, AND GARIBALDI'S REBELS IN THE STRUGGLE TO RULE MODERN ITALY (2006).
25. See Kunz, supra note 19, at 311-12 (providing examples of the Holy See acting as a
sovereign during the period of 1870-1929).
26. Treaty of Conciliation, It.-Vatican, pmbl., Feb. 11, 1929, available at http://www.hol.com
/-mikesch/treaty.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
27. The Treaty of Conciliation addressed the Holy See's political status. Id. In the Financial
Convention, Italy paid the Holy See for the loss of the Papal States. Financial Convention, It.-
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territorial jurisdiction over Vatican City, but in reality all major civic
functions are supplied by the Italian government, as provided in the
Pacts.28 Rather than relying on this incomplete territorial
independence, the Holy See's status as an international sovereign lies
in its history and role as spiritual head of over one billion people,
independent of its control of the Vatican. This history makes the Holy
See practically unique in international law, 29 because in modern times
other states treat territorial jurisdiction as a sine qua non for
sovereignty. 30 Today, the Holy See maintains diplomatic relations
with 176 nations, including the United States.
The Holy See's unique international status is partly a result of
the unique religious organization it directs, the Catholic Church. The
Holy See and the pope maintain a degree of spiritual and ecclesial
control over Catholics exceeding all other international religious
organizations. Under canon law, the Holy See coordinates the ecclesial
affairs of the worldwide church by creating and organizing new
dioceses.31 The Holy See also names bishops to lead those dioceses and
transfers them between different dioceses or religious offices within
the Holy See. 32 Canon law also provides minimum requirements for
ordination as a priest or bishop. 33
Vatican, pmbl., Feb. 11, 1929, available at http://www.hol.com/-mikesch/treaty.htm (last visited
Aug. 31, 2010). The Concordat regulates "the conditions of religion and the Church in Italy."
Concordat, It.-Vatican, pmbl., Feb. 11, 1929, available at http://www.hol.com
/-mikesch/treaty.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
28. Treaty of Conciliation, supra note 26, art. 6.
29. The only other currently recognized non-territorial sovereign is the Sovereign Military
Order of Malta (also known as the Knights of Malta, or St. John's Hospitallers). Its claim to
sovereignty rests in its former dominion over Rhodes until 1523 and Malta until 1798. The Order
maintains diplomatic relations with 104 states, but not the United States. Order of Malta,
Bilateral Relations with Countries, http://www.orderofmalta.org/diplomatic-relations/862
/bilateral-relations-with-countries/?lang=en (last visited Aug. 31, 2010). The Order's sovereignty
has not been tested in U.S. courts.
30. For example, the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization were
denied sovereign status in the United States because they lacked full autonomy over the land
they nominally controlled. Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 274, 288-89 (1st Cir.
2005) (partially requiring for sovereignty that the party claiming immunity "has a defined
territory . . . under control of its own government," and that "to satisfy these requirements, a
state's government must, at a bare minimum, be independent and in general control of its
territory, maintaining at least a modicum of law and order"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1987) ("A state is an entity that has a defined territory and a
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the
capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.").
31. 1983 CODE c.373 (Vatican). The Congregation for Bishops oversees the creation and
modification of dioceses. NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW 510 (John P. Beal et al.
eds., 2000) [hereinafter NEW COMMENTARY].
32. 1983 CODE c.377, § 1. The local bishops submit names of suitable Episcopal candidates
to the Congregation of Bishops every three years. The Congregation in turn chooses three of
1512
2010] HOLY SEE LIABILITY 1513
The pope, through the administrative support of the Curia, can
discipline Catholics by numerous means. Such measures can include
prohibiting certain people from speaking or teaching in the name of
the Catholic Church,34 removing clerics from ecclesial office, 35
suspending priestly faculties, 36 dismissing clerics from the clerical
state,37 and, most drastically, excommunication. 38 Since the Council of
Vatican II in the 1960s, 9 most excommunications have resulted either
from conflicts with the teaching authority of the Holy See or from
prohibited ecclesial actions such as ordaining women or unauthorized
men as priests and bishops. 40 During this time, the Holy See itself has
rarely punished clerics for personal immorality, opting instead to
leave such matters to the discretion of the local bishop. 41
These ecclesial sanctions generally have only a limited and
indirect material effect. For example, Charles Curran, who in 1986
was prohibited from teaching at Catholic institutions due to his public
disagreement with Catholic doctrine on sexual morality, was granted
tenure at Southern Methodist University instead.42 Marcel Lefebvre, a
these to submit to the pope, who makes the final decision. NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at
515.
33. See 1983 CODE cc.232-61(listing requirements for the selection and spiritual formation
of priests); id. c.378 (listing the qualifications for bishops).
34. Id. c.1336, § 1 n.2.
35. Id.
36. Id. c.1333.
37. Id. c.1336, § 1 n.5.
38. Id. c.1331. Interestingly, the 1983 Code does not define excommunication; it simply lists
its spiritual effects. The commentators note "the excommunicated person remains a member of
the Church and subject to its legislation." NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 1549.
39. The Second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965, a council of Catholic bishops addressing
issues facing the Catholic Church in the modern world, fundamentally altered the Church's
relationship with the world and how it viewed its mission. This resulted in several practical
changes throughout the Church, such as liturgy in the vernacular and increased ecumenical
activity.
40. An Internet search revealed roughly thirty formally declared excommunications during
2000-2009. Of these, twenty-three were for ordaining women or unauthorized men as priests or
bishops, or for joining or creating schismatic communities. Another six were for heretical beliefs.
41. The exception that proves the rule was the disciplining of Fr. Marcial Maciel Degollado,
the Mexican founder of the religious order Legionaries of Christ. In January 2006, Pope Benedict
XVI ordered Fr. Maciel, the elderly public icon of the Order, to a "quiet life of 'prayer and
penitence'" after allegations surfaced that he had sexually abused several Mexican seminarians.
Ian Fisher & Laurie Goodstein, Vatican Disciplines Founder of Order over Abuse Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2006, at A6. In 2009, a year after his death, the new head of the Legion admitted
that Fr. Maciel had fathered at least one child. Laurie Goodstein, Catholic Order Jolted by
Reports That Its Founder Led a Double Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at A19. Fr. Maciel's
silencing was extraordinary because he was the founder of a religious order and not subject to
any local bishop's authority; any punishment had to come from the Vatican.
42. See AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: THE CATHOLIC
UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA 28-33 (1989), available at http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres
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French bishop who opposed the reforms of Vatican II and was
excommunicated for ordaining bishops without the pope's consent, 43
continued under his own organization to promulgate his views.44
Furthermore, bishops who have resigned from office still maintain
their salary and accommodations from Church funds, and the Church
still provides support to dismissed clergymen in need.45
This is not to say that sanctions are irrelevant, but they are not
generally sanctions as thought of in the secular world. Rather, such
discipline is useful only insofar as the disciplined person considers it a
spiritual penalty. Some excommunicated Catholics, such as female
priests, consider their status a badge of honor rather than a
sanction. 46 Priests and bishops desiring to stay within the church and
avoid ecclesial penalties (or, a cynic might argue, desiring an ecclesial
promotion) would do well to follow the Holy See's directives. Yet it is
reasonable to assume that most do so out of their own belief in the
righteousness of the pope's actions and policies, and their desire to be
in spiritual communion with the pope, rather than out of fear of the
material effects of possible sanctions. Furthermore, clerics have a
lower chance of reputational harm or public humiliation because
canon law instructs bishops to use public discipline only as a last
resort. 47 Public discipline will ensue only if the cleric persists in his
offending actions. The absence of a material effect from these ecclesial
sanctions creates problems when a secular court must determine to
what extent the pope and the Holy See control the actions of bishops
and priests.
/9CA4679F-7BC7-4AD7-BA37-OC1BOOAEBAA1//CatholicUUSA.pdf (discussing the background
leading up to Curran's dismissal from the Catholic University of America ("CUA")). Curran left
CUA in 1988, spent two years as a visiting professor at various institutions, and then accepted
the tenured position at SMU in 1990. Father Curran to Take Post at SMU, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1990, at F17.
43. POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC LETTER "ECCLESIA DEI" para. 3 (1988).
44. The Catholic Church treated Lefebvre's organization, the Society of Saint Pius X
("SSPX"), and the four excommunicated bishops as schismatic until 2009. Lefebvre initially
created the SSPX in 1970, and it quickly became an international organization. SSPX, Question
1: What Is the Society of St. Pius X?, http://www.sspx.org/SSPXFAQs/ql-sspx.htm (last visited
Aug. 31, 2010).
45. 1983 CODE c.1350, § 1. For example, in Ireland, four bishops have resigned due to their
participation in cover-ups of sexual abuse, yet they will maintain their salaries and living
conditions. Bishop May Lose His Job, But Not His Salary or Standing in the Church, BELFAST
TEL., Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/bishop-may-lose-his-
job-but-not-his-salary-or-his-standing-in-the-church-14590816.html.
46. See, e.g., ABC 7 News, Female Priest Excommunicated, May 30, 2008, http://www.wjla.
com/news/stories/0508/524380.html (quoting excommunicated Bridget Mary Meehan: "The
excommunication ... just encourages us to go forward").
47. 1983 CODE c.1341 (requiring bishops to impose penalties only as a last resort, after
other non-coercive methods such as fraternal correction or rebuke have failed).
[Vol. 63:5:15071514
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B. The Holy See's Knowledge of Clerical Sexual Abuse
The duty of the Holy See to monitor its priests and report
sexual abuse derives from its canon law. In 1917, the Curia completed
a decade-long codification of church law into the 1917 Code of Canon
Law. Following Vatican II, Pope Paul VI sought to update the canon
law, resulting in the new 1983 Code. Because older abuse cases
occurred in the context of the 1917 Code, it is important to highlight a
key difference between the two. The 1917 Code of Canon Law made
"adultery, debauchery, bestiality, sodomy, pandering, [and] incest"
ecclesial crimes.48 It mandated without reservation the suspension of
guilty clerics and removal from any office, and "in more serious cases,"
deposition. 49 However, it did not specifically require clerics or the laity
to report civil crimes to the civil authorities, and it also lacked the
1983 Code's "canonization" of civil law. The 1983 Code directs that
"civil laws to which the law of the Church yields are to be observed in
canon law with the same effects,"50 which requires both laity and
clergy to report civil crimes to civil authorities as a matter of canon
law. Prior to 1983, neither the laity nor the clergy bore an ecclesial
duty to report civil crimes to civil authorities, and failure to do so bore
no ecclesial sanctions.
Under respondeat superior liability for employers, parties
seeking to hold the Holy See liable for sexual abuse committed by a
priest must first show that the Holy See knew or should have known
that such abuse was occurring.51 Many American Catholic bishops and
dioceses have fought to prevent the public disclosure of all documents
possibly demonstrating knowledge of the abuse. 52 However, some
released documents demonstrate that local bishops, and perhaps the
Holy See, might have known of specific instances of sexual abuse. For
example, one 1979 letter from Cardinal Medeiros of Boston to the Holy
See referred to Father Shanley as a "disturbed individual," though the
48. 1917 CODE c.2359, § 2.
49. Id.
50. 1983 CODE c.22.
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04(b) (2006) (refusing to impute notice of a
fact from the agent to the principal when the agent acts adversely to the principal unless the
principal ratifies or knowingly retains a benefit from the agent's action).
52. The diocese of Bridgeport, Connecticut, recently lost a seven-year court battle to keep
12,000 pages of lawsuit records sealed. Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.,
970 A.2d 656 (Conn. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 500 (Nov. 2, 2009); Michael P. Mayko,
Diocesan Documents on Clergy Sex Abuse to be Released, CONN. POsT, Dec. 1, 2009,
http://www.ctpost.com/default/article/Diocesan-documents-on-clergy-sex-abuse-to-be-271098.php.
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letter discusses this only with regard to his preaching and ministry.53
However, the vast majority of cases show no direct link between the
Holy See and any particular priest.
The best evidence of the Holy See's knowledge of abuse came in
1962, when the Holy See issued specific instructions to its bishops for
handling cases of solicitation. Solicitation is the ecclesial crime of
making sexual advances upon a layperson during or in connection
with the sacrament of confession. 54 "On the Manner of Proceeding in
Cases of the Crime of Solicitation" (hereinafter "The 1962 Policy") sets
forth a complex procedure for handling solicitation cases in an
ecclesial court. During the "inquisition," or investigation phase, the
accuser is made to take oaths of honesty and secrecy.55 The
investigation should be pursued in secrecy and "with the greatest
circumspection" to avoid scandal. 56 If the allegation indicates "a crime
serious enough but not yet sufficient to institute an accusatorial
process," the accused cleric should be admonished secretly in writing.57
Effectively, the matter comes into the open only if the allegations are
reasonable enough to require an ecclesial trial. Penalties for
solicitation range from removal of the faculties to perform the
sacraments to complete laicization.58 Finally, it calls solicitation of
youths "the worst crime" and requires any decision in such cases to be
communicated to the Holy See.5 9
The 1962 Policy demonstrates that priestly sexual advances
during or after confession concerned Curia officials enough to create
secretive, specific procedures for handling the cases. It does not
require laypeople or clerics to inform the civil authorities if the
solicitation also amounts to a civil crime. It certainly encourages the
shroud of secrecy that kept so many sex abuse cases under wraps for
so long. On the other hand, the 1962 Policy clearly outlines an
ecclesial procedure for an ecclesial crime. If the priest had made
consensual advances on an unmarried adult woman, it would have
53. Letter from Humberto Cardinal Medeiros, Archbishop of Boston, to Franjo Cardinal
Seper, Congregation for Doctrine of the Faith (Feb. 12, 1979), available at
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/documents/shanley_021279.htm.
54. CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (William Fanning ed., 1912), available at http://www.
newadvent.org/cathenil4134b.htm.
55. CONGREGATION OF THE HOLY OFFICE, ON THE MANNER OF PROCEEDING IN CASES OF
SOLICITATION § 23 (1962).
56. Id. § 38.
57. Id. §§ 42(c), 43.
58. Id. § 61. Laicization, or more popularly "defrocking," removes the priest's ecclesial
ability to function as a priest. The man is no longer ecclesially bound by his vows and is no longer
a formal member of the clergy.
59. Id. §§ 73-74.
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been an ecclesial crime, but not a civil crime. The 1962 Policy never
discusses any actions to be taken with regard to the civil authority;
the drafters might have assumed that other civil laws would be
followed.
C. The FSIA and the Recent Cases Attacking the Holy See's Immunity
Passed in 1976, the FSIA provides immunity to foreign
sovereigns in American courts unless the complaint properly alleges a
theory of liability under one of the statutory exceptions.60 The
immunity offered is immunity from the jurisdiction of American
courts, not merely immunity from liability.61 Among the exceptions,
the tortious act exception strips immunity in cases "in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury ...
occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or
omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that
foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment." 62 But immunity is not stripped if the claim is "based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion [is]
abused."63
Congress passed the FSIA in part to establish a uniform
method of acquiring jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in federal
court.6 4 Prior to 1976, the State Department would determine whether
a sovereign could receive immunity in each particular case, creating
considerable uncertainty and inequitable decisions.65 The FSIA shifted
this determination to the courts to reduce the appearance of bias when
granting immunity. The accompanying House Report noted that
Congress wanted a uniform standard for jurisdiction.66 Similarly, the
Supreme Court later found that Congress specifically allowed removal
from state courts to encourage uniformity.67
In 2009, plaintiffs in two cases convinced courts of appeals to
allow their cases against the Holy See to proceed under the tortious
act exception to the FSIA. In the first case, O'Bryan v. Holy See, three
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2008); id. § 1605 (listing the exceptions).
61. Id. § 1604.
62. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
63. Id. § 1605(a)(5)(A).
64. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6-8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605-06.
65. Id. at 6606.
66. Id. at 6611; see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983)
(citing the House report).
67. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 489.
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plaintiffs sued the Holy See in a putative class action, representing all
victims of clerical sexual abuse.68 The plaintiffs themselves alleged
that they were the victims of sexual abuse in the 1920s, 1960s, and
1970s.6 9 They sued the Holy See directly and in its capacity as the
employer of the bishops of the abusive priests for "violation of
customary international law of human rights; negligence; breach of
fiduciary duty; and the tort of outrage/intentional infliction of
emotional distress."70 In stating their claims, the O'Bryan plaintiffs
relied heavily on the 1962 Policy, claiming that it required bishops to
"refuse to report childhood sexual abuse committed by priests to
criminal or civil authorities, even where such failure to report would
itself be a criminal offense."71 In partially affirming the district court's
decision, the Sixth Circuit held that the respondeat superior claims
against the Holy See for the bishops' negligent supervision of its
abusive priests satisfied the FSIA's tortious act exception.72 However,
the direct liability claims all involved acts that occurred outside the
United States and did not survive on appeal.73 Also, because the
O'Bryan court assumed the abusive acts fell outside the priests' scope
of employment, the Holy See could not be held vicariously responsible
for those, either.74 Thus, the only claims that survived were those
alleging respondeat superior liability for the bishops' negligent
supervision and other acts. The plaintiffs have since dropped the
case, 75 but the precedent set lives on.
In the second case, Doe v. Holy See, an unnamed plaintiff sued
the Holy See, along with the Archdiocese of Portland, the bishop of
Chicago, and the Order of Friars Servants ("Servites"), for the Holy
See's role in assigning the Servite priest Andrew Ronan to a Portland,
Oregon parish.76 Doe alleged that Father Ronan repeatedly abused
him during his time at the parish.77 The Ninth Circuit held that the
Holy See could be held liable under respondeat superior for the actions
of its employee, Father Ronan. The direct negligence claim against the
Holy See failed, however, because hiring Father Ronan and failing to
68. 556 F.3d 361, 369-70 (6th Cir. 2009).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 370 & n.1 (noting that "respondeat superior liability" is not a separate cause of
action and that these claims will be addressed together with the claims of direct liability).
71. Id. at 370.
72. Id. at 386.
73. Id. at 387-88.
74. Id. at 385-86.
75. John L. Allen, Jr., Plaintiffs Drop Lawsuit Against Vatican, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Aug.
10, 2010, http://ncronline.org/news/accountability/plaintiffs-drop-lawsuit-against-vatican.
76. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2009).
77. Id. at 1070.
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warn parishioners about him were discretionary acts.7 8 Interestingly,
the court also held that vicarious liability against the Holy See for the
actions of the archdiocese, the bishop, and the Servites was not proper,
because the plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to overcome the
presumption of a separate juridical status for these entities.79 In
essence, the court found that respondeat superior liability for the Holy
See rested on the actions of the priest, not-as the Sixth Circuit
found-the bishop.
III. Is RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR ACTUALLY SUPERIOR?
The plaintiffs in O'Bryan and Doe considered respondeat
superior liability an attractive means of holding the Holy See liable in
American courts. However, the opinions in these cases pass over two
legal obstacles and create an unforeseen practical problem. First, the
Supreme Court has traditionally held that when Congress uses
"employee" in a statute, it intends to use the traditional definition of
"employee" under agency law. Whether a priest or bishop is an
employee of the Holy See is an important analytically because the very
question of the Holy See's immunity turns on this issue. The court
must make this legal determination at the time immunity is asserted
or challenged. To overcome the immunity, the plaintiff must plausibly
allege in the complaint that a priest or bishop is indeed an employee,
instead of simply asserting it. Yet the Holy See does not pay diocesan
priests, direct their actions, or even discipline them except in rare
instances-all of which are indicators of employment status under
agency law. The Holy See exercises even less control over priests in
religious orders. Instead, discipline is left to each diocese's bishop and
each order's superiors. Even bishops are not paid by the Holy See or
otherwise "employed"; bishops are largely left alone in directing the
day-to-day operations of their dioceses. Therefore, it is highly
questionable whether priests and bishops qualify as "employees"
under agency law.
Second, understanding the relationship between priest, bishop,
and pope requires delving into Catholic doctrine. Catholic theology
proclaims the pope's authority over all Catholics, but in practice this
authority is delegated to the bishops, who exercise substantial control
over Church policymaking and day-to-day operations. Yet American
courts traditionally abstain from ruling on ecclesial or doctrinal
issues. To resolve the issues raised in determining a priest's status
78. Id. at 1069.
79. Id.
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vis-a-vis the pope, these courts of appeals pass over the ecclesial
abstention question.
Finally, even if respondeat superior liability properly attaches,
it creates practical problems of unfairness and unpredictability
because it rests in state common law claims. Each state's common law
defines "employee," "scope of employment," and the employer-
employee relationship differently. First, this is unfair to plaintiffs in
some states, who will be barred from bringing essentially the same
claim as plaintiffs in other states can bring. It is also unpredictable for
the Holy See, which must adjudicate its sovereign immunity against
fifty different state laws rather than a single federal law. The
unfairness and unpredictability run counter to a major purpose for
enacting the FSIA: to provide a uniform method for determining
jurisdiction and immunity in cases against foreign sovereigns.
A. "Do Not Be Called 'Master' "80: Priests And Bishops as
Employees of the Holy See
Courts must consider the nature of a priest or bishop's
relationship to the Holy See when ruling on a defense of sovereign
immunity. Yet not all priests and bishops easily meet the common law
definition of "employee."
The FSIA strips foreign sovereigns of immunity for "the
tortious act or omission . .. of any official or employee of that foreign
state while acting within the scope of his office or employment."81 This
immunity is not simply immunity from liability, but rather immunity
from jurisdiction.82 If the court determines that the priest or bishop is
not an employee of the Holy See, it must dismiss the case
immediately, without considering the merits of the claim.
The plaintiffs in both Doe and O'Bryan alleged that the abusive
priests were employees of the Holy See,83 but the courts required
different levels of pleading to survive the motions to dismiss that were
filed in both cases. In Doe, the Ninth Circuit panel wrote, "We are
80. Matthew 23:10 (New American Bible).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2008).
82. Id. § 1604; see also Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002)
("[S]overeign immunity is an immunity from trial, not just a defense to liability on the merits.").
83. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1070 (quoting the complaint: "Defendant . . . has unqualified power
over . . . each and every individual and section of the Church"); O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d
361, 369 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting the complaint: "The sexual molestation in question 'occurred
while the abusive Roman Catholic priest, agent, servant or employee was acting within the scope
of his employment, as part of an agency relationship with the Defendant, Holy See, and the
misconduct was committed with the apparent authority arising from this employment and/or
agency relationship.' ").
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highly skeptical of the notion that under notice pleading, use of the
word 'employee' in a complaint is insufficient to establish an allegation
of an employee relationship."84 The Ninth Circuit essentially held that
simply calling a priest an employee, without more, is sufficient to
allege an employee relationship and survive a motion to dismiss. It
even argued that a complaint's allegation of the priest as an
"employee" is meant in the colloquial manner, not as a legal definition,
and that the court should not "engage in a hypertechnical reading of
the complaint."85
Yet the very issue of the Holy See's sovereign immunity turns
on whether the priest was an "official or employee ... acting within
the scope of his office or employment." 86 In several cases, most recently
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the Supreme Court has
held that when Congress does not otherwise define "employee" and
"scope of employment," it intends to use the common law definitions of
these terms. 7 Under the FSIA, each state would define "employee"
and "scope of employment" in their common law.88 Therefore, the court
must determine whether a priest is an employee of the Holy See under
applicable state law. Simply accepting the plaintiffs characterization
of a priest as an employee, without more, only ignores the crucial
question.
In contrast to Doe, the Sixth Circuit in O'Bryan held that the
employee inquiry "focuses on the degree of control exercised by the
employer over the individual or individuals in question."89 After
considering the relevant Kentucky law, the court held:
[Pilaintiffs allege facts that demonstrate that the Holy See exercised a significant degree
of control over the bishops and archbishops accused of having committed the tortious
acts in question. Taking these allegations as true, plaintiffs have sufficiently pled the
employee element of the tortious activity exception. 90
84. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1081.
85. Id. (internal citation omitted).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
87. 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (applying common law definition of employee to determine if work
was for hire under copyright law); see also Kelley v. S. Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1974)
(applying common law definition to the Federal Employers Liability Act); Baker v. Tex. & Pac.
Ry. Co., 359 U.S. 227, 227 (1959) (same as Kelley); Robinson v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 237 U.S.
84, 94 (1915) (same as Kelley). But see NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124-32 (1944)
(rejecting common law definition of employee for the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")
because the purpose and structure of the NLRA required such).
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 1606 ("[The foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances."). The Supreme Court interpreted
this to mean that state substantive law provides the rule of liability. First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983).
89. O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 386 (6th Cir. 2009).
90. Id.
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Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit looked more closely
at the complaint's allegations and required the plaintiff to allege
enough facts that, if true, create an employer-employee relationship.
The Sixth Circuit's heightened pleading requirement on this
issue is better than the Ninth Circuit's requirement for two reasons.
First, the Sixth Circuit's approach is more in accord with the Supreme
Court's new "plausibility" standard in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
for evaluating complaints on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 91 When a
plaintiff sues a foreign state, the court should ensure that the facts
pled, if true, show a plausible employment relationship between the
tortfeasor and the sovereign. Otherwise, the court risks wasting
valuable time and resources allowing discovery against a sovereign,
whom it must dismiss at a later stage if the alleged employment
relationship does not exist. Furthermore, an American court will likely
have difficulties conducting and enforcing discovery requests against a
foreign sovereign. Sovereigns likely will not turn over incriminating
documents, which they can easily hide behind claims of state secrecy.
The Holy See has already demonstrated that it will not willingly
cooperate with these foreign investigations; the papal nuncio, or
ambassador, to Ireland refused to cooperate with the Murphy Report
that investigated Dublin clerical abuse or to meet with lawmakers
afterward. 92 Thus, plaintiffs will not likely discover any new evidence
to change the court's analysis of the agency relationship.
These are the same concerns, in a different setting, that
motivated the Twombly opinion. There, the Court worried that
discovery would be exceedingly onerous and drag the litigation out for
years with little chance of finding the "smoking gun" documents for a
conspiracy. 93 Therefore, as in Twombly, courts confronting suits
against the Holy See should require the plaintiff to allege enough facts
that, if true, establish the priest or bishop as an employee of the Holy
See. This approach allows courts to determine the agency relationship
at the outset and dismiss cases that cannot evade the Holy See's
sovereign immunity.
Second, the Sixth Circuit's heightened pleading requirement
makes sense because it is not clear whether all priests and bishops are
91. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). In 2009, the Court announced that
Twombly applied to all cases, not just fraud and conspiracy. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1939,
1949-50 (2009).
92. Mary Fitzgerald, Decision of Papal Nuncio not to Attend Ddil Committee 'Scandalous',
IRISH TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, available athttp://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/
/2010/0216/1224264554852.html. The Murphy Report detailed the systematic cover-up of
hundreds of sexual abuse allegations through several decades in Dublin.
93. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557-58.
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actually employees of the Holy See. Clerics come in many guises. For
example, the apostolic nuncio to the United States functions as a
traditional ambassador. He relays the Holy See's political and
religious concerns to the United States and also informs the Holy See
about American Catholic affairs. The nuncio, like an ambassador or
other traditional diplomat, is clearly an "official or employee" of the
Holy See. In contrast to the nuncio, the silent priests and monks of the
Carthusian order, such as those in Vermont, belong to insular, self-
sustaining religious communities with almost no contact with the
outside world.94 A court would strain very hard to find a Carthusian
priest an employee of anyone, let alone the Holy See.
Somewhere between the apostolic nuncio and a Carthusian
priest lie the diocesan bishops and priests. The court must determine
whether the priest or bishop is an employee according to state agency
law. Although an individual state's common law definition of
"employee" may slightly differ, the Restatement (Third) of Agency
defines "employee" as "an agent whose principal controls or has the
right to control the manner and means of the agent's performance of
work."95 The comment on this definition lists many factual
considerations for determining whether a person is indeed an
"employee," including:
[1] [T]he extent of control that the agent and the principal have agreed the principal
may exercise over details of the work; [2] whether the agent is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business; [3] whether the type of work done by the agent is customarily
done under a principal's direction or without supervision; [4] the skill required in the
agent's occupation; [5] whether the agent or the principal supplies the tools and other
instrumentalities required for the work and the place in which to perform it; [6] the
length of time during which the agent is engaged by a principal; [7] whether the agent is
paid by the job or by the time worked; [8] whether the agent's work is part of the
principal's regular business; [9] whether the principal and the agent believe that they
are creating an employment relationship; and whether the principal is or is not in
business. [10] Also relevant is the extent of control that the principal has exercised in
practice over the details of the agent's work. 9 6
In the priest-bishop relationship, secular factual indicia of an
employment relationship exist. For example, the priest works on
diocesan-owned property, and receives his salary from diocesan funds.
However, the Holy See directs its bishops and priests purely through
its spiritual authority and canon law. In the United States, the Holy
94. As the Charterhouse's website makes clear, the only visitors allowed are men making
vocational retreats to discern the Carthusian life. The monks themselves live silent lives and do
not use the telephone or Internet. Their only external communication is by letter or fax.
Charterhouse of the Transfiguration, Frequently Asked Questions (F.A.Q.), http://
transfiguration.chartreux.org/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006).
96. Id. § 7.07 cmt.f (numbering added by Author).
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See will generally choose bishops for each diocese and establish the
ecclesial laws for their governance and administration, but otherwise
the employment analysis is tenuous. Consider the Holy See's
relationship to diocesan bishops using the ten factors from the
Restatement.
First: "The extent of control that the agent and the principal
have agreed the principal may exercise over details of the work."
Canon law grants bishops "the power of governance" over their
dioceses by virtue of their office, not by delegation from the Roman
pontiff.97 Furthermore, each bishop sets his own agenda, priorities,
and administrative policies for his diocese. Lastly, the complex
relationship of authority between the bishops and the pope is a matter
of church doctrine. 98 To determine this factor, courts would have to
interpret church doctrine, but this is likely barred by the ecclesial
abstention doctrine, as discussed below.
Second: "Whether the agent is engaged in a distinct occupation
or business." Bishops have distinct offices and powers within the
Catholic Church. A court can recognize this without recourse to
Catholic doctrine or law to determine what those powers are.
Third: "Whether the type of work done by the agent is
customarily done under a principal's direction or without supervision."
Canon law mandates that bishops send a report to the pope every five
years.99 But other supervision is informal, and the bishop can
implement the Holy See's directives as he sees fit. Furthermore,
unless transferred to other dioceses, bishops generally are removed
from office only in cases of gross negligence or misuse of funds.100
Church doctrine and canon law does grant the pope final authority,101
but in practice the pope and the Holy See do not generally involve
themselves in local diocesan affairs. If a court can determine this
97. 1983 CODE c.131, § 1; id. c.381, § 1.
98. The Code of Canon Law states that the pope "possesses supreme, full, immediate, and
universal ordinary power in the Church, which he is always able to exercise freely." Id. c.331.
Yet, a diocesan bishop "has all ordinary, proper, and immediate power which is required for the
exercise of his pastoral function" except for items explicitly reserved by the pope. Id. c.381, § 1.
Catholic doctrine also indicates that bishops exercise a parallel authority in union with the pope.
99. Id. c.399, § 1.
100. Former Boston archbishop and cardinal Bernard Law was transferred to a Vatican
office after he resigned over his handling of clerical abuse cases. Al Baker, Cardinal Law Given
Post in Rome, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at Al3. Former Phoenix bishop Thomas O'Brien
resigned following both a clerical abuse settlement and his culpability in an unrelated fatal hit-
and-run accident. John M. Broder, 'Unraveled' by Sex Abuse Crisis in Diocese, Phoenix Bishop
Quits, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at Al.
101. 1983 CODE c.331, § 1. The canon's statement that the pope "possesses supreme, full,
immediate, universal, and ordinary power" must be interpreted in light of other canons, such as
that granting the college of bishops "supreme ... power over the universal Church." Id. c.336.
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without recourse to church doctrine or law, it seems to favor a finding
of no employment because of the wide latitude of practical authority
for bishops.
Fourth: "The skill required in the agent's occupation." This
factor usually comes into play if the agent has particular artisanal
skills, such as carpentry or pottery. Bishops, like regional managers of
a corporation, usually have management or financial skills;102 they
also have liturgical and ecclesial functions defined by Catholic
doctrine and canon law. 103 A bishop's skills might favor a finding of
employment, but as these are not unique to the position of a bishop,
they also do not greatly influence the analysis.
Fifth: "Whether the agent or the principal supplies the tools
and other instrumentalities required for the work and the place in
which to perform it." Churches, property, liturgical vestments, and
other items are legally owned by the diocesan corporation under the
control of the bishop.104 The diocese generally acquired this property
through donations from its congregants and its own purchases. Any
claim to the Holy See's ownership lies in canon law,105 which does not
bind the court. Legally, the bishop is supplying the tools and
instrumentalities. This supports a finding of no employment.
Sixth: "The length of time during which the agent is engaged
by a principal." Bishops and priests are engaged by the Church for
their lives. This would favor a finding of employment.
Seventh: "Whether the agent is paid by the job or by the time
worked." The Holy See does not pay bishops. Instead, they are paid
through their diocesan funds.106 Dioceses receive money from local
Catholic donations, investments, and other secular sources. This
strongly favors a finding of no employment.
Eighth: "Whether the agent's work is part of the principal's
regular business." Bishops are instrumental in the Holy See's mission
102. These are not hard and fast requirements, however. The Code of Canon Law lists the
qualifications for bishops, id. c.378, and the only non-religious one is to be "endowed with other
qualities which make him suitable to fulfill the office in question." Id. c.378, § 1.
103. See, e.g., id. c.375, § 1 ("[Tlhey are teachers of doctrine, priests of sacred worship.").
104. See, e.g., CHANCERY OFFICE, ARCHDIOCESE OF GALVESTON-HOUSTON, FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS AND INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REPORTS 8-10 (2008), available at http://www.diogh.
org/admin.accounting.htm(outlining the different types of property the diocese owns).
105. 1983 CODE c.1273. Even this canon limits the pope's "supreme" administration to
"ecclesiastical goods," whereas the original draft included "all temporal goods." NEW
COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 1474. Thus, a question exists even within canon law of the
pope's authority to control, for example, diocesan property other than churches. Furthermore,
this power is "rarely exercised." Id.
106. See, e.g., CHANCERY OFFICE, supra note 104, at 6 (showing diocesan expenses, including
salaries).
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of spreading the Catholic faith. This supports a finding of
employment.
Ninth: "Whether the principal and the agent believe that they
are creating an employment relationship." This can only be
understood through Catholic doctrine. At the very least, the bishop
and the Holy See can be said to be in an inferior-superior relationship,
but bishops do not understand themselves to be employees as such. If
the court can determine this without recourse to Catholic doctrine, it
favors a finding of no employment.
Tenth: "Also relevant is the extent of control that the principal
has exercised in practice over the details of the agent's work." As
noted above in Factor Three, this tends to be minimal, except for
canonically prescribed five-year reports. While certainly much
informal communication goes back and forth between the Vatican and
a diocese, the local bishop administers the details.
Using these ten factors, six favor not finding the bishop an
employee, two are of little consequence, and only two support such a
finding. These two factors of support are the bishop's indefinite time in
office and his agreement with the Holy See that Catholicism should
spread around the world. These alone hardly support a finding of
employment. Also, because a diocesan priest is paid by and reports to
the diocese rather than the Holy See, he is even further removed from
the Holy See's secular control. Lastly, five factors would likely require
analyzing Catholic doctrine either to answer the question or to
support a finding of employment. As discussed in Part III.B, this
creates its own problems.
The plaintiff in Doe relies on the fact that the Holy See chooses
its bishops and can remove them at will in order to establish the
bishops as employees. 107 This alone, however, does not create
employment status. A person building a house, for example, does not
establish an employment relationship with his construction contractor
simply because he has chosen that contractor's services and can
dismiss at will.1 08 The contractor is still an independent contractor
unless the principal controls the details of the work. Like contractors,
the pope's ability to appoint and dismiss bishops, without more, does
not turn bishops into employees.
107. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[The Holy See] creates, appoints,
assigns and re-assigns bishops [and] superiors of religious orders, and through the bishops and
superiors of religious orders [it] has the power to directly assign and remove individual clergy.").
108. See, e.g., Wortham v. Am. Family Ins. Grp., 385 F.3d 1139, 1140-41 (8th Cir. 2004)
(listing an "at will" agency relationship as a factor in favor of finding the agent to be an
independent contractor, not an employee).
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The result is that the ten factors of the Restatement do not
support on their own the conclusion that a bishop or priest is an
employee of the Holy See. For five factors that might support a
conclusion on employee status, courts will find that Catholic doctrine
intrudes on the analysis. This leads to the second major problem in
applying respondeat superior liability to the Holy See, the ecclesial
abstention doctrine.
B. "Render Unto Caesar What Is Caesar's, and to God What Is
God's"109: The Ecclesial Abstention Doctrine in American Courts
Although the Sixth Circuit in O'Bryan correctly required more
pleading than the Ninth Circuit to satisfy Twombly, it failed to
consider a second issue when analyzing the relationship of bishops
and priests to the Holy See: the ecclesial abstention doctrine.
Respondeat superior liability can only be extended to employers, but
courts must analyze church doctrine to find a bishop an employee of
the Holy See.
The Supreme Court has articulated a long-standing tradition of
abstaining from deciding questions that implicate church doctrine. In
Watson v. Jones,10 the Court held that "questions of discipline, or of
faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law" must be left to the church
and are binding on civil courts."' Later, in Gonzalez v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Justice Brandeis wrote, "[I]n the
absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper
church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting
civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as
conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or
otherwise."112 Gonzalez involved a cleric who sued to recover his
chaplaincy position, but the Court refused to intervene. The Gonzalez
Court also clarified that following canon law does not constitute
"arbitrariness."113
Ecclesial abstention reached its zenith in Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v. Milivojevich.114
The Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court's decision
that defrocking priests and reorganizing dioceses was "arbitrary" if
109. Matthew 22:21 (New American Bible).
110. 80 U.S. 679 (1872).
111. Id. at 727.
112. 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
113. Id. at 17.
114. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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done without the diocese's approval.115 Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, held that courts cannot even inquire into whether the
ecclesial body followed its own rules and procedures:
For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory are in
that sense "arbitrary" must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or
ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else in to the
substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question.
But this is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits.' 1 6
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court should
only abstain when its ruling "plac[es] its weight behind a particular
religious belief, tenet, or sect."" 7 In Jones v. Wolf, the Court seemed to
shift toward Rehnquist, holding that church property disputes could
be resolved "so long as [the disputes involve] no consideration of
doctrinal matters.""18 If courts can apply "neutral principles" of
generally applicable law, they can adjudicate certain religious
disputes." 9
The "neutral principles" doctrine in Jones is the current test for
applying the ecclesial abstention doctrine. It has also influenced the
Court in other religion cases, particularly those involving the Free
Exercise Clause. For example, in Employment Division v. Smith, the
Court held that Oregon could disqualify members of the Native
American Church from unemployment benefits due to their religious
use of peyote.120 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held that "[t]he
only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral generally applicable law to religiously
motivated action have not involved the Free Exercise Clause alone,
but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections."121 Yet the dispute in Smith did not require the Court to
resolve a fact necessary for applying the law by reference to religious
115. Id. at 712-13.
116. Id.
117. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 733 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118. 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (internal citation omitted).
119. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03.
120. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
121. Id. at 881. Congress quickly abrogated Smith with the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act ("RFRA"), but the Court held that extending RFRA to the states was unconstitutional. City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). Therefore, the Smith analysis still applies to
neutral, generally applicable state laws. However, if the law targets a specific religious ritual, it
must be the least restrictive means to protect a compelling government interest. Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993). For a full discussion on
Smith and its aftermath, see Christopher R. Farrel, Note, Ecclesiastical Abstention and the
Crisis in the Catholic Church, 19 J.L. & POL. 109, 121-27 (2003).
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doctrine; the respondents admitted to using peyote. 122 The Court also
explicitly endorsed the ecclesial abstention cases.123
So far, no court has directly addressed the ecclesial abstention
doctrine in cases seeking vicarious liability for Catholic bishops or the
Holy See, mainly because in most cases the offending priest's actions
were deemed outside the scope of his employment. 124 However, courts
addressing negligent hiring and supervision claims against American
Catholic bishops or religious orders have split on how to apply the
doctrine.
Those allowing claims to proceed have presented two main
arguments. First, some courts have held that there is generally
applicable law to be used that does not require referencing church
doctrine. As the District Court of Connecticut held in Nutt v. Norwich
Roman Catholic Diocese, "[t]he court's determination of an action
against the defendants based upon their alleged negligent
supervision ... would not prejudice or impose upon any of the
religious tenets or practices of Catholicism."12 5 Second, hearkening
back to Justice Rehnquist's Milivojevich dissent, abstention from this
question amounts to religious immunity from liability that non-
religious organizations would be subject to, which could violate the
Establishment Clause. 26
However, other courts have abstained from deciding issues
regarding negligent hiring or supervision. The Gonzales case before
the Supreme Court concerned the Church's decision in a hiring matter
for a particular chaplaincy, and the Court refused to step in.127
Furthermore, as at least one court has argued, if the state allows only
122. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
123. Id. at 877.
124. Of course, making this determination is also arguably subject to the ecclesial abstention
doctrine, because the scope of the priest's employment is determined by church law. However,
this issue can be sidestepped if the court expands the "scope of employment" to include
intentional torts that were made available to the employee through the purpose of his
employment or were incidental to his legitimate work activities. See infra notes 124-31 and
accompanying text. Then, the only question is whether the intentional tort became performable
because of legitimate work activities. The majority of abusive priests first met their victims when
the children either served at Mass or went to confession. While the full scope of a priest's
legitimate clerical activity may be debatable, saying Mass and hearing confessions are
indisputably part of his work.
125. 921 F. Supp. 66, 74 (D. Conn. 1995).
126. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese of the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 734
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127. Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
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a single model of clergy selection and discipline, it violates the Free
Exercise Clause.128
The cases involving negligent hiring and supervision only ask
whether the bishop exercises sufficient secular authority over the
priest to create an employment relationship, and courts have already
split on whether to abstain from analyzing the priest-bishop
relationship. Extending this question to include the Holy See just
magnifies the problem, because the Holy See's authority over a bishop
or priest is almost entirely spiritual (or at least ecclesial) in nature.
The Holy See proceeds almost solely through canon law and Catholic
doctrine. It sets requirements for clerics in canon law, and Catholic
doctrine influences how it treats clerics.129 It chooses bishops through
mechanisms created in canon law and defines their roles through
canon law and Catholic doctrine. 130 It investigates and tries ecclesial
crimes through canon law procedures in ecclesial courts,131 and it only
dispenses ecclesial punishments authorized under canon law.132 The
Holy See's decisions on priestly laicization or removal from office also
take into account canon law requirements that reflect religious
concerns of forgiveness, mercy, and personal spiritual renewal.133 The
Holy See reserves the most severe penalty, excommunication, for
challenges to the structure or doctrine of the Church, not personal
immorality.134 In all of this, the Holy See is trying to see as God does,
not as men do. A secular court analyzing a priest or bishop's
relationship with the Holy See must necessarily grapple with Church
doctrine and law to determine the fact of employment.
The problem, then, is that to establish a factual predicate-the
existence of an employment relationship-to the generally applicable
law of vicarious liability, a secular court would have to interpret
128. Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997) ("[J]udicial inquiry into hiring,
ordaining, and retaining clergy would result in an endorsement of religion, by approving one
model for church hiring, ordination, and retention of clergy.").
129. See supra note 33 (discussing the role of canon law in setting requirements for clerics).
130. 1983 CODE cc.375-411.
131. The Catholic Church has an elaborate ecclesial court system. See id. cc.1400-1670
(providing canon guidelines for trials in general and "contentious trials," or those with factual
disputes, as well as provisions for the execution of sentences and hearing of appeals).
132. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (discussing ecclesial sanctions and
punishments under canon law).
133. See, e.g., 1983 CODE c.1341 (requiring bishops to impose penalties only as a last resort,
after other non-coercive methods have failed); id. c.1344 (allowing the ecclesial judge to defer,
suspend, or abstain from imposing a penalty if the offender has reformed himself or led a
"praiseworthy life"); id. c.1345 (allowing a judge to waive a penalty if the offense was committed
"from fear, necessity, the heat of passion, or mental disturbance from drunkenness").
134. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing punishment of
excommunication).
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Catholic doctrine and law. Christopher Farrel has argued that the
ecclesial abstention cases would bar the determination of a factual
predicate to applying a general law if that determination necessitated
judicial interpretations of church doctrine or ecclesial law, stating:
[W]hile it is certainly true that the so-called "Smith rule" holds that the First
Amendment does not excuse an individual from the obligation to comply with a valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes conduct
that his religion prescribes, nothing in Smith allows courts to resolve questions of
religious law or doctrine to determine whether the factual predicates of that generally
applicable law have been established. Moreover, the Smith opinion itself noted the
continued validity of the ecclesiastical abstention cases. From these principles, it follows
that if a court must interpret questions of church policy or doctrine in order to decide
whether the factual predicates for a neutral, generally applicable law have been
established, the ecclesiastical abstention cases would bar that analysis, and the law
could not be applied. That these cases involve disputes between church officials and
members of the laity, rather than between two factions within a single church, does not
change the fact that the particular dispute still turns on questions of ecclesiastical law-
specifically, the church's hiring practices and its supervisory authority over its
individual priests.1 3 5
For courts addressing vicarious liability suits against the Holy
See, the very factual predicates that determine whether a bishop is an
employee require the court to interpret religious doctrine. How exactly
should a secular court handle a canon law provision declaring that the
pope "possesses supreme, full, immediate, and universal ordinary
power in the Church, which he is always able to exercise freely,"136
while another gives a diocesan bishop "all ordinary, proper, and
immediate power which is required for the exercise of his pastoral
function"? 137 Does the First Vatican Council's declaration of papal
infallibility somehow make the bishop an "employee"?138 Or does the
Second Vatican Council's statement that bishops "exercise their own
authority for the good of their own faithful" imply that bishops are
more like independent contractors? 139 These questions, along with the
factors discussed in Part III.A, all require the court to interpret
ecclesial doctrine when determining the facts necessary to find bishops
to be employees, and this is exactly what Gonzalez, Milivojevich, and
Watson prohibit. If the facts cannot be determined, the law cannot be
applied.
Plaintiffs might attempt to resolve this problem by arguing
that the ecclesial abstention doctrine only says that courts cannot
resolve the ecclesial question themselves. This way, courts could still
135. Farrel, supra note 121, at 135.
136. 1983 CODE c.331.
137. Id. c.381, § 1.
138. FIRST VATICAN COUNCIL, PASTOR AETERNUS ch. 4, 9 (1870).
139. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, LUMEN GENTIUM 1 22 (1964).
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rely on the doctrine's answer in secular cases. Yet even where Catholic
doctrine or canon law is fairly clear, bishops and priests are never
considered "employees" of the Holy See or the pope. Bishops in
particular are understood as exercising a sometimes inferior,
sometimes parallel authority to the pope or the Holy See.140 Therefore,
even using the secular label "employee" is inappropriate.
Thus, analyzing whether a priest or bishop is the Holy See's
employee almost certainly will require analysis of Catholic doctrine
and law, which the ecclesial abstention doctrine forbids. If a court
cannot determine that a priest is an employee, the Holy See simply
cannot be subject to vicarious liability.
Abstaining from this question is not appealing. The 1962 Policy
indicates that at least by then, the Holy See had some general
knowledge of clerical sexual abuse. Some victims of the abuse may
want to have their day in court against the Holy See, not for the
damages award, but for vindication. They want it held morally
responsible. Yet for those plaintiffs seeking liability for the Holy See,
Catholic doctrine simply stands in the way of applying respondeat
superior liability.
C. "Do Not Consider Who a Person Is; Give Ear to the Lowly and to the
Great Alike"141: Unfair and Unpredictable Application of the FSIA
Finally, suppose the court has managed to determine that
bishops and priests are employees of the Holy See without recourse to
Catholic doctrine and law. The court must then determine whether
the abusive priest was acting within the scope of his employment for
the Holy See to be liable through respondeat superior. Some states,
such as Oregon, have defined "scope of employment" to include certain
intentional torts.142 Other states do not include intentional torts in
their definitions, and some have explicitly held that sexual abuse does
not fall within the scope of employment.143 Because the FSIA relies on
state agency law to determine the rule of liability,144 this creates
unfairness and unpredictability for potential plaintiffs and for the
Holy See. It is unfair because the plaintiffs in some states would be
barred from suing the Holy See based solely on their residence in that
140. See, e.g., id. 18-25 (endorsing principles of collegiality between the pope and
bishops).
141. Deuteronomy 1:17 (New American Bible).
142. Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1168-69 (Or. 1999).
143. See infra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing Georgia case law).
144. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622
n.11 (1983).
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state. It is unpredictable because the Holy See's immunity would
depend on fifty different state laws.
Consider the scope of employment in Oregon, which expanded
its definition to include certain intentional torts in Fearing v. Bucher
in 1999.145 There, the plaintiff Steven Fearing alleged that he had
been abused by a priest, Melvin Bucher, in the Portland archdiocese in
the 1970s, and he sought to hold the archdiocese vicariously liable.146
The Oregon Supreme Court first stated the test for vicarious liability,
which includes a determination that "the act must have been of a kind
that the employee was hired to perform."147 Under this definition, it is
absurd to think the priest was within the scope of his employment.
However, "the inquiry does not end there," for the court held that
when considering intentional torts, it is more appropriate to ask "if the
acts that were within Bucher's scope of employment 'resulted in the
acts which led to injury to plaintiff.' "148 Using this definition of "scope
of employment" for intentional torts, the court found a jury could
reasonably conclude that Bucher had access to Fearing and other
victims through his employment as a priest, which would make the
archdiocese vicariously liable. 149 Against the archdiocese's objection
that this would subject any employer to vicarious liability for its
employee's sexual torts, the court noted that a "nexus" must exist
"between the employment and the assault," and the court relied on a
fiduciary relationship between priest and congregant to establish this
nexus. 1 0 The court then denied the archdiocese's motion to dismiss. 15 1
The Ninth Circuit in Doe explicitly relied upon the Fearing analysis to
deny the Holy See's motion to dismiss.152
On the other hand, Georgia flatly refuses to hold religious
organizations vicariously liable for the sexual torts of their ministers.
In Alpharetta First United Methodist Church v. Stewart, the plaintiff
alleged an improper sexual relationship with a Methodist minister
and sued both the local church and the North Georgia Conference of
145. 977 P.2d at 1168-69.
146. Id. at 1164.
147. Id. at 1166 (citing Chesterman v. Barmon, 753 P.2d 404, 404 (Or. 1988)).
148. Id. (quoting Chesterman, 753 P.2d at 443) (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 1167.
150. Id. at 1168. This was to distinguish an earlier case, which the court had dismissed after
finding that a hospital could not be held vicariously liable when a respiratory therapist sexually
assaulted an unconscious patient because the act was outside the scope of employment. G.L. v.
Kaiser Found. Hosps., 757 P.2d 1347 (Or. 1988). The court's reasoning here seems specious,
because the therapist would not have had access to that particular patient without being a
therapist employed by the hospital.
151. Fearing, 977 P.2d at 1168-69.
152. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009).
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the Methodist Church.153 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss. It held that
even if it was a nonconsensual relationship, "it is well settled under
Georgia law that an employer is not responsible for the sexual
misconduct of an employee." 154 The court added that the intentional
torts, "being purely personal in nature, are unrelated to the
employee's duties and, therefore, are outside the scope of employment
because they were not in furtherance of the master's business."1 5 5 In
reference to the minister's scope of employment, the court stated, "The
record shows that such behavior is clearly contrary to the tenets and
principles of the Methodist church and is not a part of, or in any way
incidental to, a minister's duties and responsibilities."15 6 The same can
be said of a priest in the Catholic Church. Thus, suing for respondeat
superior liability against the Holy See for its priests' sexual
misconduct simply is not a cause of action in Georgia.
States are split on whether sexual torts absolutely fall outside
the "scope of employment" for purposes of respondeat superior. Four
states and the District of Columbia would allow suits against
employers for the sexual torts of their employees to proceed; 57 at least
twelve states would not hold employers vicariously liable. 58 This
creates a problem for exporting the vicarious liability theory to foreign
sovereigns. Because the FSIA relies upon state law to determine
whether a cause of action can even proceed, this means that the Holy
See's immunity from suit, not just its liability, is at stake. If the Holy
See is immune from suit, the case will be dismissed immediately
without trial, and the plaintiffs will have no chance to present their
novel theory of liability to the court. Therefore, the Holy See can
completely evade suit in certain states, while in others it faces the
possibility of both a trial and a damages award. Plaintiffs in Oregon
153. 472 S.E.2d 532, 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
154. Id. at 535.
155. Id. at 535-36.
156. Id. at 536.
157. Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990); Flores v. Autozone W.
Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Brown v. Argenbright Sec., Inc., 782 A.2d 752
(D.C. 2001); Lange v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 1973); Baker v. Saint Francis
Hosp., 126 P.3d 602 (Okla. 2005).
158. Porter v. Harshfield, 948 S.W.2d 83 (Ark. 1997); Special Olympics Fla., Inc. v.
Showalter, 6 So.3d 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Green v. Carlinville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 1,
887 N.E.2d 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Sandman v. Hagan, 154 N.W.2d 113 (Iowa 1967); Williams v.
Cmty. Drive-In Theater, Inc., 520 P.2d 1296 (Kan. 1974); Miller v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc.,
304 N.E.2d 573 (Mass. 1973); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997); N.X. v. Cabrini Med.
Ctr., 765 N.E.2d 844 (N.Y. 2002); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Drake v. Star Mkt.
Co., Inc., 526 A.2d 517 (R.I. 1987); J.H. By & Through D.H. v. W. Valley City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah
1992); Smith v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr., 184 P.3d 646 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
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can collect from the Holy See's deep pockets, while the Georgia
plaintiffs are left penniless.
The problem becomes even more acute when considering
bankrupt dioceses. To date, seven Catholic dioceses have entered
bankruptcy, due in part to the sexual abuse claims against them. 59
Plaintiffs in those dioceses would have good reason to seek their
remedy from the Holy See's deeper pockets. Oregon law would allow a
plaintiff in the Archdiocese of Portland, which has declared
bankruptcy, to sue the Holy See. But a plaintiff in Spokane,
Washington would only be able to sue the bankrupt diocese of
Spokane, because current Washington law effectively prevents a suit
alleging vicarious liability against the Holy See.160
This unfairness, unpredictability, and inconsistency run
counter to the uniformity Congress sought in passing the FSIA. The
House Report notes that Congress intended to encourage uniformity
when finding jurisdiction,' 6' and it specifically allowed removal from
state courts to encourage uniformity.162 Yet because the state laws
defining employer liability for intentional torts are different, the law is
not even applied consistently to a single sovereign for multiple similar
cases. This surely cannot be what Congress intended in passing the
FSIA.163
The unfairness and unpredictability for litigants are additional
practical concerns for using respondeat superior liability to hold the
Holy See responsible for clerical sexual abuse. In addition to the legal
problems with analyzing priests and bishops as employees of the Holy
See and the likely intrusion of the ecclesial abstention doctrine,
respondeat superior becomes an unwieldy, improper tool for holding
the Holy See accountable. What the courts, plaintiffs, and the Holy
See need is a theory of liability that avoids the common law definitions
of employee and employment, focuses on the de facto operations of the
Catholic Church, and applies uniformly to all cases. Plaintiffs can
achieve this through the international criminal law analogue of
respondeat superior liability, command responsibility.
159. The seven dioceses are the Archdiocese of Portland, Oregon and the dioceses of Tucson,
Arizona; Spokane, Washington; Davenport, Iowa; San Diego, California; Fairbanks, Alaska; and
Wilmington, Delaware. BishopAccountability.org, Bankruptcy Protection in the Abuse Crisis,
http://www.bishop-accountability.org/bankruptcy.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
160. See Smith v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr., 184 P.3d 646, 649 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) ("An
employee's conduct falls outside the scope of his employment when his acts are directed toward
personal, sexual gratification.").
161. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6-8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605-06.
162. Id.
163. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983).
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IV. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY
A. Command Responsibility in U.S. Courts
The command responsibility doctrine developed in
international law as a means of holding military superiors directly
liable, as opposed to vicariously liable, for the war crimes of their
subordinates. Command responsibility applies to both the superior's
acts and omissions. First, a court can find "a person who planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution of a crime" directly liable for that
crime. 64 Second, a court can find a superior liable "if he knew or had
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or
had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof."65 Plaintiffs suing the Holy See would focus on the second,
passive form of command responsibility.
Passive command responsibility has three elements. First, a
relationship of effective control must exist between the superior and
the subordinate; second, the superior must "know or have reason to
know" of his subordinate's acts; and third, the superior must have
failed to take necessary steps to prevent or punish the offense.166 To
establish effective control, Allison Marston Danner notes that the
superior only needs de facto control over his subordinates, particularly
when the question involves civilian control.'67 Effective control serves
as an evidentiary standard: either a functioning hierarchy must exist,
or the scope of the de facto authority must be delineated.168 The
knowledge requirement establishes the mens rea required to be
properly held liable for the subordinate's act.169Finally, the superior
must also fail to act upon a legal duty. This duty to act does not come
164. Security Council of the U.N., Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, art. 7(1) (2009).
165. Id. art. 7(3) (emphasis added).
166. Danner, supra note 16, at 122. Danner proceeds to outline various scholarly
controversies over the different requirements, which are issues that go beyond the scope of this
Note.
167. Id. at 130.
168. Id. at 130-31.
169. For the purposes of this Note, the knowledge requirement is roughly the equivalent to
the knowledge level of mens rea understood in American criminal law: "[k]nowledge is
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes
that it does not exist." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). For a
discussion and critique of the different definitions for the knowledge requirement used in
international courts, see Danner, supra note 16, at 125-30.
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from local or national legal duties, but rather international human
rights law. 170
The Supreme Court first accepted the command responsibility
doctrine in criminal cases in Application of Yamashita,171 which
involved a habeas petition by a Japanese general convicted of war
crimes in an American military proceeding. 172 The Supreme Court
held, "We do not make the laws of war but we respect them so far as
they do not conflict with the commands of Congress or the
Constitution. There is no contention [by Yamashita] ... that the
commission held petitioner responsible for failing to take measures
which were beyond his control or inappropriate for a commanding
officer to take in the circumstances."173 An American court has also
applied the command responsibility doctrine in a civil case involving
international tort claims. In 1999, Salvadoran civilians tortured by
Salvadoran military personnel sued two Salvadoran defense ministers
in Florida under the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") through
command responsibility. 174 The jury found the two ministers liable for
"crimes against humanity" and returned a $54.6 million judgment.175
The Eleventh Circuit later affirmed the judgment on appeal, vacating
an earlier opinion holding that the statute of limitations had run. 176
The defendants did not contest the command responsibility theory of
liability, and the court did not address it on appeal.
B. Applying Command Responsibility to the Catholic Church
The command responsibility test can function as a substitute
test for determining the Holy See's liability for the actions of its
"officials . . . within the scope of their office," the other language that
determines liability under the FSIA. 177 In this way, the court can
avoid the entanglements that traditional agency law creates. Of
170. Chia Lehnardt, Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel Under International
Criminal Law, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1015, 1028 (2008).
171. 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946) (stating "the law of war presupposes that its violation is to be
avoided through the control of the operations of war by commanders who are to some extent
responsible for their subordinates" and citing the Hague Convention of 1907).
172. Id. at 5.
173. Id. at 16.
174. Ctr. for Justice & Accountability, Case Summary, http://cja.org/article.php?list=
type&type=82#LEGAL%20PROCEEDINGS (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
175. Id.; see generally Beth Van Schaack, Command Responsibility: The Anatomy of Proof in
Romagoza v. Garcia, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213 (2003) (outlining the arguments used to support
or contest the factual issues surrounding the application of command responsibility to the case).
176. Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1265 (11th Cir. 2006).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2008).
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course, it is one thing to apply command responsibility-a theory born
of international criminal law-to military officials in civil court to
obtain a civil judgment. It is admittedly quite another to apply it to a
neutral, hierarchical church without an operative military and whose
potential liability stems not from war crimes but from sexual abuse of
minors. Yet two reasons to do so stand out.
First, the Catholic Church's organization and structure share
many attributes with military command. For example, both the
church and the military send entrants to separate schools to learn
important church doctrine or military tactics. Priests and privates
answer to their superior bishop and lieutenant, respectively, for
assignments of duty and are responsible to them for their actions.
Failure to follow protocol can result in ecclesial or military discipline
unique to each organization. Bishops, like generals, are given discrete
geographic jurisdictions over which they set the priorities, oversee
internal clerical or military affairs, and exercise control. Although
bishops have substantial independence in how they carry out their
work, like regional commanders, they report to others who oversee the
entire global ecclesial or military operation.178 Both the Catholic
Church and the military have separate courts that define and
investigate crimes outside the jurisdiction of civilian courts. Indeed, it
is no coincidence that Catholic doctrine refers to the Church on Earth
as the "church militant,"179 with a mission to spread God's Word to the
four corners of the Earth.
Second, command responsibility makes sense because the
duties incumbent on the Holy See to act are grounded in international
law. Military officers are bound by international law, for example, to
treat prisoners of war humanely and to afford citizens certain
fundamental rights. 80 These rules establish the minimum protections
people around the globe expect to receive, and sovereign nations have
created them because they are seen as universal. These are the jus
cogens norms of international law, "from which no derogation is
178. American courts might have trouble determining the exact nature of the relationship
between the bishop and the Holy See, but no one can argue that the bishop does not operate in
harmony with and under the Holy See's authority.
179. In Catholic theology, this term refers to living Catholics who carry out the Church's
temporal mission. The other grand divisions of the Church are the "church triumphant" (those
who have died and entered Heaven) and the "church suffering" (those who have died and are
expiating their sins in Purgatory).
180. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art.3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (providing civilians certain fundamental rights);
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art.13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (requiring that prisoners of war be treated humanely at all times).
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permitted."181 Yet jus cogens norms do not exist solely in the law of
war; they also protect certain basic human rights.
For children, one basic right is the right to be "protected
against all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation,"182 as the
Declaration of the Rights of the Child declared in 1959. In 1990, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the first legally binding
international instrument to protect children, required governments to
"protect children from all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse."18 3
The Holy See is a signatory to the Convention.184 Thus, just as
national militaries are subject to the Geneva Conventions, the Hague
Conventions, and other instruments of the law of war, the Holy See
should be subject to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. If, by
its acts or omissions, it has contributed to the sexual abuse of
children, it should be held liable for its actions through the application
of international forms of liability. American courts can do this through
command responsibility.
Not only does the application of command responsibility make
sense in this situation, it also resolves the inherent problems of
applying American respondeat superior liability. First, the command
responsibility inquiry into effective control obviates the need to
determine whether the priest or bishop is an "employee" of the Holy
See. Instead, a court only needs to determine if, de facto or de jure, the
Holy See has the ability to effectively control its clerics' actions. A
secular court would not need to determine if church doctrine or canon
law supports this notion. Instead, the court could look to the Holy
See's public disciplinary actions of its flock, such as those discussed in
Part II. Thus, the court now has "generally applicable principles" to
analyze the Holy See's authority while abstaining from questions of
ecclesial doctrine. No longer must the court shove the round bishop's
miter into the square employee hole of American law.
Second, grounding the duty to act in international law removes
the unpredictability and unfairness that accompanies trying to
determine the "scope of employment." If the Holy See had knowledge
of clerical abuse and did not act to punish the perpetrators or prevent
future abuse, it is liable for such abuse anywhere in the United States.
Through command responsibility, the Holy See's immunity turns only
181. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (9th ed. 2009).
182. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), princ. 9 U.N. GAOR, 14th
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959).
183. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 34, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
184. The Holy See signed and ratified the Convention on April 20, 1990. United Nations
Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src-TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang-en#EndDec (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
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on the control and knowledge alleged, not on different state
jurisdictions and their agency law holdings. Plaintiffs anywhere can
bring their claims; the Holy See only has to defend its immunity in a
single, federal jurisdiction.
Command responsibility is not a windfall for plaintiffs,
however. The 1962 Policy only creates internal ecclesial procedures for
how to handle a wide range of clerical sexual proclivities. Plaintiffs
still have to prove that the Holy See actually knew of child sexual
abuse occurring in the 1950s and 1960s for the 1962 Policy to be
corroborative of such knowledge. There is also the very real factual
question of whether church discipline amounts to "effective control."
After all, history is littered with examples of priests or bishops
flouting papal directives, including the recent examples of female
priests, Charles Curran, and Archbishop Lefebvre. 185 Although the
Catholic Church is the most centralized religion in the world, its size
and mission render "effective control" a very fleeting notion at times.
A factfinder could find that priests and bishops still exercise
substantial individual freedom of action apart from church directives
or discipline.
These questions, however, are factual ones, not legal.
Command responsibility simply establishes a legal framework to
connect the abusive priest to the Holy See while avoiding the
questions of church doctrine, the tricky legal issue of defining bishops
as "employees" of the Holy See, and the unfairness and
unpredictability of applying state law from multiple state
jurisdictions.
V. CONCLUSION
Traditional respondeat superior liability presents many
problems when applied to the Holy See. The question whether a priest
or bishop is an employee is not obvious on its face, and answering this
question involves church doctrine. It also creates unfairness and
unpredictability because it relies on state agency law. To resolve these
problems, plaintiffs should try to frame their claims under command
responsibility instead. This moves the question of authority and
control from a doctrinal analysis to a factual one, and it provides a
uniform method of liability applicable throughout the United States.
While it does not provide the plaintiff a certain victory at trial, at least
it allows the plaintiffs to hold the Holy See and its bishops and priests
liable if the facts demonstrate that such a result is appropriate, for
185. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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those who have done wrong, even clergy, should be brought to justice.
"[He] will break off the horns of the wicked, but the horns of the just
shall be lifted up." 86
Jacob William Neu *
186. Psalms 75:11 (New American Bible).
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